Louisiana Law Review
Volume 6 | Number 3
December 1945

Workmen's Compensation - Right of
Unacknowledged Illegitimate Children to Benefit
Payments
George D. Ernest Jr.

Repository Citation
George D. Ernest Jr., Workmen's Compensation - Right of Unacknowledged Illegitimate Children to Benefit Payments, 6 La. L. Rev. (1945)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol6/iss3/15

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

482

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. VI

encounter great difficulty in translating the son's technical wrong
into a responsibility to be shouldered by the parent.'0
WADE H. DAVIS

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-RIGHT OF UNACKNOWLEDGED ILLE-

GITIMATE CHILDREN TO BENEFIT PAYMENTS-The

father of two ille-

gitimate children was killed while in the defendant's employ.
Plaintiff, mother and tutrix of the minor children of this union,
sued for damages and in the alternative for compensation under

the Workmen's Compensation Act. The supreme court on first
hearing disallowed the claim for damages, ruling that Article
2315 of the Revised Civil Code applied only to legitimate children.
The claim to compensation was not allowed as the children had
not been formally acknowledged in accordance with the provi-

sions of Article 203 of the Revised Civil Code as required by the
Workmen's Compensation Act.- Upon rehearing the court reversed its previous stand and allowed compensation benefits to
the children, though not formally acknowledged, because they
were dependent upon the deceased for support. Thompson v.

Vestal Lumber & Manufacturing Company, 22 So. (2d) 842 (La.
1945).
Obviously the decision in this case is not in accordance with
a strict interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Sec-

tion 8, Subsection 2 (H), of the act specifically provides that the
term "child" or "children" shall cover illegitimate children acknowledged under the provisions of Civil Code Articles 203, 204,
and 205. Hitherto, the court has followed the strict letter of these
provisions. 2 The provisions of Section 8, Subsection 2 (D) do not
seem to have been mentioned by the court or used in any way
to justify the rights of illegitimate children. Hence the prior
jurisprudence has steadfastly denied the right of illegitimates,
unacknowledged according to the provisions of Article 203 of the
10. Compare Sullivan v. Creed (1904) Ir. R. 1025 with Swanson v. Crandall, 2 Pa. Super. 85 (1896). Shearman and Redfleld, A Treatise on the Law
of Negligence (rev. ed. 1941) § 761.
1. La. Act 20 of 1914, § 8(2) (H), as amended by La. Act 242 of 1928 [Dart's
Stats. (1939) § 4398J.

2. Perkins v. Brownell-Drews Lbr. Co., Ltd., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894 (1920);
Lillian Gullung v. Dalgarn Const. Co., 1 La. App. 147 (1924); Wells v. WhiteGrandin Lbr. Co., Inc., 13 La. App. 696, 129 So. 171 (1930); Stewart v. Parish
of Jefferson Davis, 17 La. App. 626, 136 So. 659 (1931); Barranco v. Davis,
175 La. 35, 142 So. 844 (1932); Beard v. Rickert Rice Mills, Inc., 185 La. 55,
168 So. 492 (1936).
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Civil Code, to recover benefit payments under the act.3 Neither
the illegitimate child,4 nor the parents of such a child have been
allowed benefits5
The decision is in keeping, however, with the liberal interpretation that in other respects has been given the act by the
Louisiana courts. The decisions of the courts of this state as well
as those of our sister states are replete with both direct holdings
and dicta which give effect to the true purpose of statutes of this
type. With respect to the right to workmen's compensation, the
courts are very liberal in upholding the claim of a person who
marries another who has a living and undivorced spouse.6 "The
right of a surviving dependent relation of a deceased workman
to be compensated under the Employer's Liability Act, should
not be construed strictly in favor of the employer, but rather
liberally in favor of the employee and his dependent relations."'
If the father is dependent to any extent upon his son's support,
he may recover for his son's death.8 The rights of the putative
wife to compensation would give way- only to a claim which
might be asserted by an actual, dependent wifeY The courts of
other states voice much the same idea and give effect to the same
0
liberal interpretation of the act as have the Louisiana courts.'
The position adopted in the instant case comports with the
liberal attitude taken in the state toward the rights of illegitimate children to inherit even though, they have not been acknowledged in accordance with the pr4visions of Article 203 of
the Civil Code. Certainly as early as l2l, in Taylor v. Allen,"
it was recognized that an illegitimate child not formally acknowl3. Ibid.
4. Wells v. White-Grandin Lbr. Co., Inc., 13 La. App. 696, 129 So. 171
(1930); Barranco v. Davis, 175 La. 35, 142 So. 844 (1932); Beard v. Rickert
Rice Mills, Inc., 185 La. 55, 168 So. 492 (1936).

5. Perkins v. Brownell-Drews Lbr. Co., Ltd., 147 La. 337, 84 So. 894 (1920).
6. Dillon v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 183 So. 553 (La. App. 1938).
7. Jones v. Powell Lbr. Co., 156 La. 767, 769, 101 So. 135, 136 (1924).
8. Cauthorn v. Cypress Tank Co., 1 La. App. 100 (1925).
9. Jones v. Powell, Lbr. Co., 156 La. 767, 101 So. 135 (1924); Rollins v.
Foundation Co., 154 So. 674 (La. App. 1934); Dillon v. Traders and General
Ins. Co., 183 So. 553 (La. App. 1938). See also Fulton Bag and Cotton Mills
v. Fernandez, 159 So. 339 (La. App. 1935), where the court "with regret"
allowed the legal, dependent wife of the deceased to recover to the absolute exclusion of the putative wife in good faith.

10. Andrea Gritta's Case, 236 Mass. 204, 127 N.E. 889 (1920), where the
court in effect said that considerations of public policy which prevent a
wrongdoer from participating in the benefits of his act ought not to apply
to Innocent children born out of wedlock for they are not responsible for
their status, they have committed no wrong, and they must be supported;

Portin v. Portin, 149 Tenn. 530, 261 S.W. 362 (1924).
11. 151 La. 82, 91 So. 635 (1921).
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edged by its parents could inherit. In this case a child was held
able to establish that she was acknowledged by her mother and
thereby entitled to inherit without proving acknowledgment in
the manner prescribed in Article 203. It was clearly held on rehearing in Minor v. Young 12 that the mode prescribed in Article
203 was not exclusive and the jurisprudence to that effect was
adhered to. Since these cases, only one distinction has been
drawn with regard to this specific situation. Formal acknowledgment under the provisions of Article 203 is required where the
parent is attempting to inherit from the illegitimate child, but
the illegitimate child seeking to inherit from the parent may
prove acknowledgment in some way other than by Article 203.13
In view of this well established jurisprudence with regard to successions, it was a relatively easy step for the court to adopt a
similar attitude toward the already liberally construed Employers' Liability Statute.
The rule of the present case has long been recognized in
various other states. The courts of Michigan unqualifiedly made
dependency the basis of recovery as early as 1916 in a case where
the legal wife and legitimate daughter were denied recovery in
favor of the adulterous children of the deceased worker.14 At
about the same time in Maine dependent illegitimate children
were allowed to recover as members of the deceased's family.15
The court of that state defined a family as a "collective body of
persons who live in one house under a head or manager who has
a legal or moral duty to support the members thereof."' 16 The
Massachusetts court in 1920 recognized the rights of an illegitimate child to benefit payments under the compensation statute,'
while the doctrine was embraced in Connecticut a year earlier. 8
Other states have since taken a similar position.' 9
Louisiana's late entry into the "recovery allowed" column
can perhaps be justified in the fact that our degree of industriali12. 148 La. 610, 87 So. 472 (1920).
13. Succession of Lacosst, 142 La. 673, 77 So. 497 (1917); Ellis v. UnionCompress and Warehouse Co., 178 So. 726 (La. App. 1938). See also Comment (1945) 6 LOUISIANA LAW REviEw 268.
14. Roberts v. Whaley, 192 Mich. 133, 158 N.W. 209 (1916).
15. Scott's Case, 117 Maine 436, 104 Atl. 794 (1918).
16. 117 Maine 436, 441, 104 Atl. 794, 796.
17. Andrea Gritta's Case, 236 Mass. 204, 127 N.E. 889 (1920).

18. Piccinim v. The Connecticut Light & Power Co., 93 Conn. 423, 106
Atl. 330 (1919).
19. See, for example, California: Moore Shipbuilding Corp. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 185 Cal. 200, 196 Pac. 257 (1921); Kentucky: L. E.
Myers Co. v. Noland, 222 Ky. 748, 2 S.W.(2d) 387 (1928); Tennessee: Portin
v. Portin, 149 Tenn. 530, 261 S.W. 362 (1924).
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zation, with its correspondingly large percentage of workers, has
not been high; and the development of the law has been correspondingly more conservative. However, a definite trend toward
giving full effect to the act can be noted in 1942 when the court
allowed relations by affinity to recover benefit payments strictly
on the basis of dependency and membership in the family of the
deceased, even though these particular classes were not specifically enumerated in the act.2 0 The court here recognized the
primary purpose of legislation of this type to shift the burden of
loss to the community in general and judicial cognizance was
given to a liberal construction of the act with a view to carrying
out its purpose.
GEORGE D. ERNEST, JR.
20. Archibald v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., 202 La. 89,
11 So.(2d) 492 (1942).

